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made a part of the record. Therefore, a complete copy of the jury
instructions,

as

given, has

been

attached

hereto

as

Addendum

Number 1.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Appellant seeks relief from the May 6, 1986 sentencing order
on the grounds that the trial court improperly
jury.

Appellant

has

also

instructed

the

instructed

undersigned

to

the
seek

relief from the said order on the grounds that (1) the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of law, and (2) that the trial court
had no authority to require him to reimburse Sevier County for
the attorney's fees it paid to defendant's trial counsel.
At the same time that defendant was charged with the offense
referred to in this appeal, he was also charged with another,
separate, drug-related crime. Defendant petitioned this Court for
leave

to

file

an

interlocutory

petition was ultimately denied

appeal

in

that

matter.

That

(Utah Supreme Court case number

860129), and, the State has elected not to pursue that charge.
That matter is not before this Court and should not be confused
with the issues raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undersigned did not act as appellant's trial counsel. A
careful review of the transcript of the trial proceedings shows
the following facts.
Two sheriff's deputies met with

an undercover

agent. The

agent was searched, wired for sound and given money. (T.48). The
transmitting device was tested and found to be working properly.

3
(T.51). The agent went to defendant's home where he encountered
defendant and others. (T.49,71). The officers were acquainted
with defendant from prior contacts. (T.50,64). They recognized
defendant's voice as they listened over their listening equipment
from a nearby location. (T.50,67). The officers could not see
what was happening. (T.56,70,75).
The

agent

engaged

defendant

in

a

conversation ' about

marijuana, during which price and quantity were discussed. (T.5455,67). Neither officer could remember exactly what was said.
(T.55,68). According to what the officers overheard, a deal was
struck.

(T.49,67). Shortly thereafter, the agent met with the

officers at a nearby location and delivered to them a baggie of
marijuana and the balance of their money. (T.49).
The officers made a tape recording

of the

conversation

between the agent and defendant, but the tape was later ruined.
(T.59). A partial transcript of the tape was available at trial.
(T.60,62).
A witness present at defendant's home at the time was called
to testify. (T.79). He offered conflicting accounts of the events
of

that

day.

(T.79,85).

He

had

made

a

prior

inconsistent

statement. (T.8 4).
The undercover agent, Doug James, did not appear at the
trial. The substance delivered by the agent to the officers was,
in fact, marijuana. (T.78).
The trial court instructed the jury, giving, inter alia,
instruction number 22, to-wit:

4
Every person acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense
who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct, which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct. (A copy of this
instruction is found in Addendum Number
1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The undersigned believes that the first error cissigned by
the appellant, i.e., that the jury was improperly instructed, is
a valid, appealable issue as to which a genuine legal argument
exists. However, there appears to be nothing

in the record to

support

defendant,

the

remaining

points

raised

by

the

i.e.,

insufficiency of the evidence and lack of jurisdiction to order
reimbursement for attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I:

THE

TRIAL

COURT'S

INSTRUCTION

NUMBER

22

WAS

IMPROPER.
The trial court's instruction number 22 is a verbatim quote
of § 76-2-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The State cannot utilize
law from the Utah Criminal Code (Title 76) in a prosecution under
the Utah Controlled Substances Act (Title 58, chapter 37).
When there is a conflict between Title 76 and Title 58, the
court is required to follow Title 58.
" . . .
[W]henever
the
requirements
prescribed, the offenses defined or the
penalties imposed
relating to
substances
controlled by this act shall be or appear to
be in conflict with . . . any other laws of
this state, the provisions of this act shall

5
be controlling." § 58-37-19, U.C.A., 1953 as
amended (emphasis added).
The above-quoted section (58-37-19) was cited by this Court
as controlling in the case of State v. Hicken, 659 P,2d 1038
(Utah, 1983), a case in which the facts were extremely similar to
those in the instant matter. In that case, the defendant was
charged with distribution of a controlled substance for value, in
contravention of § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), U.C.A., 1953 as amended,
the same statute as the one used by the State herein. The trial
court

found

arranging

the

that

defendant

sale

of

should

marijuana,

have
as

been

defined

charged
by

§

with
58-37-

8(1)(a)(iv), and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The state
argued that defendant was properly charged with distribution for
value since he would be guilty of that offense under § 76-2-202
if

he

solicited,

requested,

commanded,

encouraged

or

intentionally aided another person to engage in that criminal
conduct.
In the Hicken case, this Court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal

of

the

distributing

charge,

citing

the

statutes:
"The provisions of this code shall govern the
construction of, the punishment for, and
defenses against any offense defined in this
court,
or,
except
where
otherwise
specifically
provided
or
the
context
otherwise requiresf
any offense defined
outside this code; provided such offense was
committed after the effective date of this
code." State v. Hicken, supra, at 1039,
quoting § 76-1-103(1), U.C.A.,
1953 as
amended (emphasis the Court's).
"It is the purpose of this act to regulate

following

6
and control the substances designated within
section
58-37-4,
and
whenever
the
requirements prescribed, the offenses defined
or
the
penalties
imposed
relating
to
substances controlled by this act shall be or
appear to be in conflict with . . . any other
laws of this state, the provisions of this
act shall be controlling." Id., quoting § 5837-19, U.C.A., 1953 as amended (emphasis the
Court's).
In

this

case,

evidence,

favorable

to

different

interpretations,

marijuana
else to

the

the

jury's verdict,
i.e.,

viewed
is

in

the

susceptible

either

that

to

the

agent. Under

either

of

only

defendant

to the agent or that defendant arranged
sell

light

for

most
two
sold

someone

interpretation,

such

conduct is prohibited by Chapter 37 of Title 58, U.C.A., 1953 as
amended. Selling marijuana is prohibited by § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
(the statute under which defendant was charged). Arranging for
the sale of marijuana is prohibited by § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) .
The State may freely amend its information, even up to the
time

of

the

verdict.

§ 77-35-4 (d),

U.C.A.,

1953

as

amended.

Nevertheless, the State did not even request an amendment to the
information to make it conform to the evidence. Rather, the State
elected to proceed on the distributing charge and resorted to law
from Title 76 (the accomplice section) to buttress its evidence.
The State should not have been allowed to use law from outside
Title 58 in presenting its case to the jury*
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS INSUFFICIENT,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO SUSTAIN THE JURY VERDICT.
State v. Frame,

P. 2d

31, 1986). State v. Espinoza,

, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (July
P.2d

, 39 Utah Adv. Rep.

23 (August 4, 1986). State v. Schreuder,

, 39

P.2d

Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (August 15, 1986).
POINT

III: THE

COURT

BELOW

HAD

NO AUTHORITY

TO

ORDER

APPELLANT TO REIMBURSE SEVTER COUNTY FOR THE FEES PAID TO TRIAL
COUNSEL.
§§ 77-32a-l, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the matter
remanded to the District Court for a new trial.
Dated thxs

day of August, 1986.

l^J^Jl

c/jQgj&*x^

David L. Mower
Jackson, Mclff & Mower
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

-vs-

CRIMINAL #941

LEONARD SCOTT,
Defendant,

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
INSTRUCTION jl
It is the duty of this Court to instruct you now concerning
the law which applies to this case.

It is your duty as jurors to

follow the law as I shall state it to you.
The jury's function is to decide issues of fact presented
by the Information and the Defendant's plea of "Not Guilty11.

You

should not be influenced by pity for the Defendant or by prejudice
against him.

The fact that the Defendant has been arrested or sum-

moned for this offense or that an Information has been filed against
him or that he has been brought before this Court to stand trial,
should not be considered by you.
guilt.

None of these is evidence of his

You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced
in this trial and the law which I will state to you.

You are expect-

ed to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the evidence and
applying the law of the case to reach a just verdict, regardless
of what the consequences of such verdict may be.
NO. 2 - EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS
You are the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must
determine the facts upon the evidence produced here in Court.

If

any evidence was ordered by me to be stricken, you must disregard
it entirely.

Neither should you speculate as to reasons for objec-

tions or the Court's ruling on them.
Any statement made by either counsel should not be regarded as evidence.

However, if counsel for both parties have stipulated

to any fact, you should regard that fact as being conclusively proved.
NO. 3 - CONDUCT OF JURORS
Your verdict must express the individual opinion of each
juror.

When you have reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence

of the Defendant, you should not change it merely because other
jurors may disagree with you.

Discuss your differences with an

open mind, and if you are satisfied your first conclusion was wrong,
do not hesitate to change it. Remember that you are not partisans
or advocates, but rather judges.

Page 2

NO. A - RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS
The order in which these instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance and you should not
single out any part and ignore the rest.

Consider the instructions

as a whole.
NO. 5 - WEIGHING EVIDENCE
When there is a conflict in the evidence, you should
reconcile such conflict if you reasonably can; but where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you must determine from the evidence
what the true facts are.
You are not bound to believe a witness unless his testimony is reasonable in view of all the facts.

You may believe one

witness against many or many witnesses against a few, in accordance
with your honest convictions.
NO. 6 - CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
In judging the credibility of any witness, you should
consider his possible bias, his possible interest in the result of
the trial, and any possible motive he may have to testify as he
does.

You may consider his appearance on the witness stand, the

reasonableness of his statements, his opportunity to know, his
ability to understand and his capacity to remember.

You should also

consider whether the witness contradicted himself, or was contradicted by other evidence.

From all of this you should determine his

credibility and what weight you should give his testimony.

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

You must not consider as evidence, any statement of counsel made
during this trial; however, if counsel for the parties stipulate you will
regard that fact as being conclusively proved.
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must
not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for
the objection.
You must not consider any evidence that was rejected or any

evidence

that was stricken.
A question is not evidence, and may be considered only as it supplies
meaning to the answer.
INSTRUCTION NO.

8

You are not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the
number of witnesses that testified on the opposing sides. The final test is
not the number of witnesses but in the convincing force of the evidence.
INSTRUCTION NO.

Q

If, during this trial, 1 say or do anything which suggests to you
that I favor the position

of either party, don't be influenced by such

suggestion.
I do not intend to indicate any opinion as to which party should
prevail. You are the exclusive judge of the facts.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

10

The Defendant, Leonard Scott, is accused by an Information filed in
this Court by the County Attorney of Sevier County, Utah, of having committed
the crime of Distribution For Value of a Controlled Substance in contravention
of Utah statutes.
The essential allegations to the Information are as follows:
That the Defendant, contrary to Sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code
Annotated, on the 15th day of February, 1985, at or near Aurora, Sevier County,
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally distribute for value a controlled
substance, to-wit: marijuana.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

H

Before you can convict the Defendant of distribution for value of a
controlled substance as set forth in the Information, you must find, from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime:
(1)

That on or about the 17th day of February, 1985, at or near

Aurora, Sevier County, State of Utah, said Defendant did knowingly and
intentionally distribute a controlled substance, and
(2)

That such distribution was made for value, and

(3)

That the substance was marijuana.

"Distribute for Value" means to deliver a controlled substance in
exchange for compensation, consideration, or item of value, or a promise
therefor.
If, after weighing all the available evidence, you are satisfied that
all the above elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
should find the Defendant guilty.
must find the Defendant not guilty.

If, however, you are not so satisfied, you

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

12

A person engages in conduct intentional]y, or with intent or willfully
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect
to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstance?. A person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

13

You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the Defendant
because of the fact that he has been arrested for this offense, or because
an Information has been filed against him, or because he has been brought
before the Court to stand trial. None of these facts are evidence* of his
guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of
them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

14

The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.

Both the

State of Utah and the Defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh
the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just
verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

15

The law provides that a person who 5s charged with a crime is presumed
to be innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The presumption

of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but
it is a substantial and essential part of the law and is binding upon the
jury.
trial.

The presumption of innocence follows the Defendant throughout the
This presumption is a humane provision of the law, intended so far

as human agency is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person
being unjustly punished.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

16

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies
the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it.

It must arise from the evidence or the lack of

evidence in the case.
Iff after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied of a Defendant's
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such impartial consideration
and comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an
abiding conviction of each Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to
act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own
affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.
The law does not require demonstration of that degree of proof which,
excluding all possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for such
degree of proof is rarely possible.

Only that degree of proof is necessary

which convinces the mind and directs and satisfies the conscience of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon-it.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

16A

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to
deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without
violence to your individual judgment. You must decide the case for yourself,
but should do so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow
jurors.

You should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is

erroneous.

However, you should not surrender your honest convictions

concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning
a verdict or solely because of the opinions of the other jurors.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

17

The attitude and conduct of the jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.

It is rarely productive

or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to m&ke an emphatic
expression of his opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand
for a certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense of pride
may be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from an announced position if
shown that it is fallacious. Remember, that you are not partisans or advocates
in this matter, but are judges. The fina] test of the quality of your service
will lie in the verdict which you return to the Court, not in the opinion any
of you may hold as you

retire.

Have in mind that you will make a definite

contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and
proper verdict.

To that end, the Court would remind you that in your

deliberations in the jury room, there can be no triumph excepting that
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the adminstration of justice
based thereon.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

18

These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be considered
and construed as one connected whole.

Each instruction should be read and

understood in reference to and as a part of the entire charge and not as
though any one sentence or instruction separately were intended to state the
whole law of the case upon any particular point. Moreover, the order in which
the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

19

If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely as to any
material fact in the case, you are at liberty to disregard the whole of the
testimony of such witness, except as he may have been corroborated by other
credible witnesses or evidence.

You are not bound to believe all that the

witnesses may have testified to nor are you bound to believe any witness; you
may believe one witness as against many, or many as against one.

NO. 20
TWO RE^ONABIE INTERPRETATIONS

If the evidence in this case can be interpreted two ways, each of
which appears to you to be reasonable, and if one interpretation points to the
guilt of the Defendant, and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to
adopt the interpretation pointing to innocence, and to render a verdict of
"not guiltyM.

NO. ^
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT
The Defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and his
testimony should be given the same consideration as you give to that of any
other witness, and you may test his credibility or the weight of his testimony
as you would that of other witnesses as given to you heretofore in these
instructions.
The law expressly gives the Defendant the right to remain silent at
all stages of the proceedings against him including the right not to testify
on his own behalf at the trial.

If the Defendant does not choose to testify,

you cannot consider this as any evidence of his guilt, nor may you indulge in
any speculation or presumption adverse to his innocence by reason of his
choosing not to testify.

INSTRUCTION NO. 22

Every person acting with the mental state required for the commission
of an offense who directly connmits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct, which constitues an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO.

23

I further charge you that in arriving at your verdict, you must not
consider the punishment which may be imposed upon the Defendant.

It is the

responsibility of the Court to fix the punishment within the limits allowed by
law, and it is improper for you to consider this in arriving at your verdict
of guilty or not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

24

When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your number
as foreman.

Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman and when

found, must be returned by you into Court.
Your verdict in this case must be:
Guilty of Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, a Third
Degree Felony, as charged in the Information, or

Not guilty, as your deliberations may result.

This being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous concurrence of all
the jurors to find a verdict.
DATED this

/y

day of March, 19£6,

LOUIS'G. TERVORT
ASSOCIATE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

